The E Timor Coup?

obmar · The E Timor Coup?

The E Timor Coup?
by John Martinkus
June 29, 2006

Right up until his resignation on Monday 26 June East Timor's former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri has insisted that a series of allegations against him were politically motivated. He blamed opposition groups within East Timor that had foreign backing and said this crisis was a foreign backed coup.

In a wide ranging interview last week he blamed opposition groups for the breakdown of law and order last month that led to at least 130 000 East Timorese fleeing their homes and the total collapse of the East Timorese police force. He said these people had repeatedly tried to convince prominent commanders in the East Timorese armed forces to overthrow his government in an armed coup. When this failed, they helped provoke the army mutiny which had taken the country to the brink of civil war.``They were always trying to get the command of Falintil-FDTL (East Timor Defence Forces)' he said. ``They tried to convince the command to order and participate in a coup. They failed.' It was then, he said, his opponents embarked on a program to weaken the influence of the military. ``When they failed to bring the command to join their forces in a coup then what they did is they tried to break F-FDTL and they did it by bringing out of the barracks almost 600 which they called the petitioners." It was the sacking of 600 soldiers from the tiny countries western regions that precipitated the latest violence. The soldiers were protesting what they perceived as discrimination in the armed forces which is dominated by commanders from the country's east where the guerrilla forces fighting Indonesia's 24 year occupation held out.

Senior sources within the command of F-FDTL confirmed that Alkatiri's claims were genuine. They say that not one but three separate approaches had been made to the leadership to lead a coup against Alkatiri in the past eighteen months. I was able to confirm that following the weeks of mass demonstrations against Alkatiri's government in April 2005 the commander of the F- FDTL, Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak had been approached to lead a coup by senior figures within East Timor's catholic church.He rejected the offer. Again early this year he was approached and requested to lead a coup in a meeting with two prominent East Timorese leaders and two foreign nationals. Again he refused, reportedly telling them it was against the constitution and would set an unacceptable precedent. One of his leading deputies, Lieutenant -Colonel Falur Rate Laek, a veteran of the war against Indonesia, was also approached by the same two local leaders and foreign nationals. He also refused. Due to the sensitivity of the information the nationalities of the foreigners was not revealed.

For the first time Alkatiri has given his version of what exactly led to the chaos in the capital Dili in late May and the breakdown of law and order that led to 130,000 internal refugees and the deployment of 2500 troops from Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia to quell the violence.

He says his political opponents exploited ethnic divisions within the police force to create unrest. ``Then they try to influence the PNTL (East Timor National police force). How did they do it? Through this kind of propaganda, Loromunu, Loro Sae (West vs East). They succeeded in dividing the people within the PNTL. This is the whole strategy". ``Then they put groups of PNTL against groups of F-FDTL in confrontation. And they succeeded again. This is why I requested assistance from outside,' he said in reference to the arrival of foreign troops in late May.

Alkatiri is adamant the violence was orchestrated as part of a program to topple his government. ``It has to be institutions, some organisations, inside assisted by others outside,' he said.I pressed him on this point. Who exactly was he talking about? ``I think there are outside groups ... can be from Australia maybe from Indonesia but not the governments* But still I do believe there are outside groups we need some time to investigate.'

This was not the first time Alkatiri had called the attempts to oust him an attempted coup. He continued to deny the accusations against him and his government and dismissed them as part of a misinformation campaign run by his opposition. He said the campaign was being run by conservative elements in institutions both in East Timor and abroad.

Allegations against the government of Alkatiri have proved difficult to verify. So called massacres and mass graves perpetrated by the Armed Forces apparently at the Prime Ministers request have failed to materialize and have proved to be nothing more than rumours. The most interesting allegation and the one that led directly to Alkatiri's resignation was the existence of a group of thirty armed men under the leadership of Vincente ``Rai los' de Concecao in the mountains above the town of Liquica, thirty kilometers to the west of the capital.He claimed to have received rifles from Alkatiri and the then interior minister Rogerio Lobato, who has since resigned and is now under house arrest.

De Concecao claimed Alkatiri ordered him to set up a hit squad to wipe out opponents. In response, Alkatiri said that he knew three of the men involved in the Rai Los group as they had attended the Fretilin conference in May. He also said he had had brief a meeting with them in which he told them only to enforce security and not to kill opponents as they claimed.

What is clear is that the violence that led to the resignation of the Prime Minister was initiated by soldiers who had left the military with their weapons under the command of "Major" Alfredo Reinado, a lieutenant who left the military command after becoming involved with the demonstrating soldiers. They were the ones who attacked the F-FDTL on the 23rd and 24th of May that began the violence. Perhaps the mysterious two foreign nationals and local leaders who approached the military had finally found their man in the East Timorese forces to carry out their coup.

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Background:
The Portuguese began to trade with the island of Timor in the early 16th century and colonized it in mid-century. Skirmishing with the Dutch in the region eventually resulted in an 1859 treaty in which Portugal ceded the western portion of the island. Imperial Japan occupied East Timor from 1942 to 1945, but Portugal resumed colonial authority after the Japanese defeat in World War II. East Timor declared itself independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975 and was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces nine days later. It was incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of East Timor. An unsuccessful campaign of pacification followed over the next two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 individuals lost their lives. On 30 August 1999, in a UN-supervised popular referendum, an overwhelming majority of the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia. Between the referendum and the arrival of a multinational peacekeeping force in late September 1999, anti-independence Timorese militias - organized and supported by the Indonesian military - commenced a large-scale, scorched-earth campaign of retribution. The militias killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and forcibly pushed 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly 100% of the country's electrical grid were destroyed. On 20 September 1999 the Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) deployed to the country and brought the violence to an end. On 20 May 2002, East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent state.
Geography East Timor Top of Page
Location:
Southeastern Asia, northwest of Australia in the Lesser Sunda Islands at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago; note - East Timor includes the eastern half of the island of Timor, the Oecussi (Ambeno) region on the northwest portion of the island of Timor, and the islands of Pulau Atauro and Pulau Jaco
Geographic coordinates:
8 50 S, 125 55 E
Map references:
Southeast Asia
Area:
total: 15,007 sq km
land: NA sq km
water: NA sq km
Area - comparative:
slightly larger than Connecticut
Land boundaries:
total: 228 km
border countries: Indonesia 228 km
Coastline:
706 km
Maritime claims:
territorial sea: NA
exclusive economic zone: NA
continental shelf: NA
exclusive fishing zone: NA
Climate:
tropical; hot, humid; distinct rainy and dry seasons
Terrain:
mountainous
Elevation extremes:
lowest point: Timor Sea, Savu Sea, and Banda Sea 0 m
highest point: Foho Tatamailau 2,963 m
Natural resources:
gold, petroleum, natural gas, manganese, marble
Land use:
arable land: 8.2%
permanent crops: 4.57%
other: 87.23% (2005)
Irrigated land:
1,065 sq km (est.)
Natural hazards:
floods and landslides are common; earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical cyclones
Environment - current issues:
widespread use of slash and burn agriculture has led to deforestation and soil erosion
Environment - international agreements:
NA
Geography - note:
Timor comes from the Malay word for "East"; the island of Timor is part of the Malay Archipelago and is the largest and easternmost of the Lesser Sunda Islands
People East Timor Top of Page
Population:
1,062,777
note: other estimates range as low as 800,000 (July 2006 est.)
Age structure:
0-14 years: 36.3% (male 196,293/female 189,956)
15-64 years: 60.6% (male 328,111/female 315,401)
65 years and over: 3.1% (male 16,072/female 16,944) (2006 est.)
Median age:
total: 20.8 years
male: 20.8 years
female: 20.7 years (2006 est.)
Population growth rate:
2.08% (2006 est.)
Birth rate:
26.99 births/1,000 population (2006 est.)
Death rate:
6.24 deaths/1,000 population (2006 est.)
Net migration rate:
0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.)
Sex ratio:
at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.03 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.95 male(s)/female
total population: 1.04 male(s)/female (2006 est.)
Infant mortality rate:
total: 45.89 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 52.03 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 39.44 deaths/1,000 live births (2006 est.)
Life expectancy at birth:
total population: 66.26 years
male: 63.96 years
female: 68.67 years (2006 est.)
Total fertility rate:
3.53 children born/woman (2006 est.)
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:
NA
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:
NA
HIV/AIDS - deaths:
NA
Nationality:
noun: Timorese
adjective: Timorese
Ethnic groups:
Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Papuan, small Chinese minority
Religions:
Roman Catholic 90%, Muslim 4%, Protestant 3%, Hindu 0.5%, Buddhist, Animist (1992 est.)
Languages:
Tetum (official), Portuguese (official), Indonesian, English
note: there are about 16 indigenous languages; Tetum, Galole, Mambae, and Kemak are spoken by significant numbers of people
Literacy:
definition: age 15 and over can read and write
total population: 58.6%
male: NA%
female: NA% (2002)
Government East Timor Top of Page
Country name:
conventional long form: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
conventional short form: East Timor
local long form: Republika Demokratika Timor Lorosa'e [Tetum]; Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste [Portuguese]
local short form: Timor Lorosa'e [Tetum]; Timor-Leste [Portuguese]
former: Portuguese Timor
Government type:
Republic
Capital:
Dili
Administrative divisions:
13 administrative districts; Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro (Maliana), Cova-Lima (Suai), Dili, Ermera, Lautem (Los Palos), Liquica, Manatuto, Manufahi (Same), Oecussi (Ambeno), Viqueque
Independence:
28 November 1975 (date of proclamation of independence from Portugal); note - 20 May 2002 is the official date of international recognition of East Timor's independence from Indonesia
National holiday:
Independence Day, 28 November (1975)
Constitution:
22 March 2002 (based on the Portuguese model)
Legal system:
UN-drafted legal system based on Indonesian law remains in place but will be replaced by civil and penal codes based on Portuguese law; these have passed and are expected to be promulgated in early 2006
Suffrage:
17 years of age; universal
Executive branch:
chief of state: President Kay Rala Xanana GUSMAO (since 20 May 2002); note - the president plays a largely symbolic role but is able to veto legislation, dissolve parliament, and call national elections; he formerly used the name Jose Alexandre GUSMAO
head of government: Prime Minister Mari Bin Amude ALKATIRI (since 20 May 2002)
cabinet: Council of Ministers
elections: president elected by popular vote for a five-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held 14 April 2002 (next to be held in May 2007); after the legislature was sworn in, the leader of the majority party was appointed prime minister by the president, suggesting a precedent for the future
election results: Kay Rala Xanana GUSMAO elected president; percent of vote - Kay Rala Xanana GUSMAO 82.7%, Francisco Xavier do AMARAL 17.3%
Legislative branch:
unicameral National Parliament (number of seats can vary, minimum requirement of 52 and a maximum of 65 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms); note - for its first term of office, the National Parliament is comprised of 88 members on an exceptional basis
elections: (next to be held in May 2007); direct elections for national parliament were never held; elected delegates to the national convention adopted a constitution and named themselves legislators instead of having elections; hence the exceptional numbers for this term of the national parliament
election results: percent of vote by party - FRETILIN 57.37%, PD 8.72%, PSD 8.18%, ASDT 7.84%, UDT 2.36%, PNT 2.21%, KOTA 2.13%, PPT 2.01%, PDC 1.98%, PST 1.78%, independents/other 5.42%; seats by party - FRETILIN 55, PD 7, PSD 6, ASDT 6, PDC 2, UDT 2, KOTA 2, PNT 2, PPT 2, UDC/PDC 1, PST 1, PL 1, independent 1
Judicial branch:
Supreme Court of Justice - constitution calls for one judge to be appointed by National Parliament and rest appointed by Superior Council for Judiciary; note - until Supreme Court is established, Court of Appeals is highest court
Political parties and leaders:
Associacao Social-Democrata Timorense or ASDT [Francisco Xavier do AMARAL]; Christian Democratic Party of Timor or PDC [Antonio XIMENES]; Christian Democratic Union of Timor or UDC [Vicente da Silva GUTERRES]; Democratic Party or PD [Fernando de ARAUJO]; People's Party of Timor or PPT [Jacob XAVIER]; Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor or FRETILIN [Francisco Guterres Lu OLO]; Social Democrat Party of East Timor or PSD [Mario CARRASCALAO]; Socialist Party of Timor or PST [Pedro da COSTA]; Sons of the Mountain Warriors (also known as Association of Timorese Heroes) or KOTA [Clementino dos Reis AMARAL]; Timor Democratic Union or UDT [Joao CARRASCALAO]; Timor Labor Party or PTT [Paulo Freitas DA SILVA]; Timorese Nationalist Party or PNT [Abilio ARAUJO]
Political pressure groups and leaders:
Popular Council for the Defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor or CPD-RDTL [Antonio-Aitahan MATAK] is largest political pressure group; dissatisfied veterans of struggle against Indonesia, led by one-time government advisor Cornelio GAMA (also known as L-7), also play an important role in pressuring government
International organization participation:
ACP, ARF, AsDB, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS (observer), ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, MIGA, OPCW, PIF (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WHO
Diplomatic representation in the US:
chief of mission: Ambassador Jose Luis GUTERRES
chancery: 3415 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 20007
telephone: 202 965-1515
FAX: 202 965-1517
consulate(s) general: New York (the ambassador resides in New York) (2004)
Diplomatic representation from the US:
chief of mission: Ambassador Grover Joseph REES
embassy: Avenida de Portugal, Praia dos Conqueiros, Dili
mailing address: Department of State, 8250 Dili Place, Washington, DC 20521-8250
telephone: (670) 332-4684
FAX: (670) 331-3206
Flag description:
red, with a black isosceles triangle (based on the hoist side) superimposed on a slightly longer yellow arrowhead that extends to the center of the flag; there is a white star in the center of the black triangle
Economy East Timor Top of Page
Economy - overview:
In late 1999, about 70% of the economic infrastructure of East Timor was laid waste by Indonesian troops and anti-independence militias, and 300,000 people fled westward. Over the next three years, however, a massive international program, manned by 5,000 peacekeepers (8,000 at peak) and 1,300 police officers, led to substantial reconstruction in both urban and rural areas. By the end of 2005, all refugees either returned or resettled in Indonesia. Non-petroleum GDP growth was held back in 2003 by extensive drought and the gradual winding down of the international presence but recovered somewhat in 2004. The country faces great challenges in continuing the rebuilding of infrastructure, strengthening the infant civil administration, and generating jobs for young people entering the work force. The development of oil and gas resources in nearby waters has begun to supplement government revenues ahead of schedule and above expectations - the result of high petroleum prices - but the technology-intensive industry does little to create jobs for the unemployed, because there are no production facilities in Timor and the gas is piped to Australia. The parliament in June 2005 unanimously approved the creation of a Petroleum Fund to serve as a repository for all petroleum revenues and preserve the value of East Timor's petroleum wealth for future generations.
GDP (purchasing power parity):
$370 million (2004 est.)
GDP (official exchange rate):
NA
GDP - real growth rate:
1% (2004 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP):
$400 (2004 est.)
GDP - composition by sector:
agriculture: 25.4%
industry: 17.2%
services: 57.4% (2001)
Labor force:
NA
Labor force - by occupation:
agriculture: NA%
industry: NA%
services: NA%
Unemployment rate:
50% estimated; note - unemployment in urban areas reached 20%; data do not include underemployed (2001 est.)
Population below poverty line:
42% (2003 est.)
Household income or consumption by percentage share:
lowest 10%: NA%
highest 10%: NA%
Distribution of family income - Gini index:
38 (2002 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices):
1.8% (2004)
Budget:
revenues: $107.7 million
expenditures: $73 million; including capital expenditures of $NA (2004 est.)
Agriculture - products:
coffee, rice, corn, cassava, sweet potatoes, soybeans, cabbage, mangoes, bananas, vanilla
Industries:
printing, soap manufacturing, handicrafts, woven cloth
Industrial production growth rate:
8.5%
Electricity - production:
NA kWh
Electricity - consumption:
NA kWh
Electricity - exports:
0 kWh (2003)
Electricity - imports:
0 kWh (2003)
Exports:
$10 million; note - excludes oil (2005 est.)
Exports - commodities:
coffee, sandalwood, marble; note - potential for oil and vanilla exports
Exports - partners:
Indonesia 100% (2004)
Imports:
$202 million (2004 est.)
Imports - commodities:
food, gasoline, kerosene, machinery
Debt - external:
$0
Economic aid - recipient:
$2.2 billion (1999-2002 est.)
Currency (code):
US dollar (USD)
Exchange rates:
the US dollar is used
Fiscal year:
1 July - 30 June
Communications East Timor Top of Page
Telephones - main lines in use:
NA
Telephones - mobile cellular:
NA
Telephone system:
NA
Radio broadcast stations:
AM NA, FM NA, shortwave NA
Television broadcast stations:
NA
Internet country code:
.tl; note - ICANN approved the change from .tp in January 2005
Internet hosts:
215 (2005)
Internet users:
1,000 (2004)
Transportation East Timor Top of Page
Airports:
8 (2005)
Airports - with paved runways:
total: 3
2,438 to 3,047 m: 1
1,524 to 2,437 m: 1
914 to 1,523 m: 1 (2005)
Airports - with unpaved runways:
total: 5
914 to 1,523 m: 3
under 914 m: 2 (2005)
Heliports:
9 (2005)
Roadways:
total: 5,000 km
paved: 2,500 km
unpaved: 2,500 km (2005)
Ports and terminals:
Dili
Military East Timor Top of Page
Military branches:
East Timor Defense Force (Forcas de Defesa de Timor-L'este, FDTL): Army, Navy (Armada) (2005)
Military service age and obligation:
18 years of age for voluntary military service (2001)
Manpower available for military service:
males age 18-49: 235,198
females age 18-49: 223,069 (2005 est.)
Manpower fit for military service:
males age 18-49: 179,422
females age 18-49: 184,533 (2005 est.)
Manpower reaching military service age annually:
males age 18-49: 12,740
females age 18-49: 12,438 (2005 est.)
Military expenditures - dollar figure:
$4.4 million (FY03)
Military expenditures - percent of GDP:
NA
Transnational Issues East Timor Top of Page
Disputes - international:
UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) has maintained about 1,000 peacekeepers in East Timor since 2002; East Timor-Indonesia Boundary Committee continues to meet, survey, and delimit the land boundary, but several sections of the boundary especially around the Oekussi enclave remain unresolved; Indonesia and East Timor contest the sovereignty of the uninhabited coral island of Pulau Batek/Fatu Sinai, which prevents delimitation of the northern maritime boundaries; many refugees who left East Timor in 2003 still reside in Indonesia and refuse repatriation; Australia and East Timor agreed in 2005 to defer the disputed portion of the boundary for 50 years and to split hydrocarbon revenues evenly outside the Joint Petroleum Development Area covered by the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty; dispute with Australia has hampered creation of a southern maritime boundary with Indonesia
Illicit drugs:

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U.S. Policy toward East Timor
The Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor is one of the worst atrocities of this century. It has been made possible with military and diplomatic assistance of the United States.

In 1975, Indonesia launched its invasion hours after President Ford and Henry Kissinger left from an official meeting with Suharto, the Indonesian dictator, in Jakarta. The US then doubled Indonesia's military aid, blocked the United Nations from taking effective enforcement action, and continues, to this day, to transfer new weapons, particularly helicopters.

During the height of the genocide in the late 1970s, when war and famine killed over 200,000 East Timorese, the U.S. obligingly provided equipment like OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft.

Today, human rights situation remains serious in East Timor as well as in Indonesia itself. The 1996 State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices confirms that Indonesia's armed forces continue to carry out torture, extra-judicial executions and other severe human rights violations, including the detention and imprisonment of East Timorese for the expression of their political views. Yet until recent years, the State and Defense Departments continued to keep arms and military assistance flowing to the Indonesian military even while documenting these kind of results.

After 1991, a grassroots movement has motored a bipartisan effort in Congress to reverse our government's cynical course. On November 12, 1991 in Dili, at the Santa Cruz Cemetery, Indonesian troops armed with American-made M-16 rifles gunned down more than 270 Timorese civilians.

Since then, Congress has begun to shift the direction of US policy. After the massacre, 52 Senators wrote to President Bush, calling for active US support for the implementation of the UN resolutions on East Timor "with an eye toward a political solution that might end the needless suffering in East Timor and bring about true self-determination for the territory." It was the first of a series of bipartisan House and Senate letters affirming support for East Timor's self-determination.

In October 1992, after a series of statements by Indonesian officials indicating that the massacre was an act of policy, Congress voted to cut off Indonesia's IMET military training aid. The cutoff amendment was initiated by Reps. Tony Hall (D-OH) and Ronald Machtley (R-RI), and had crucial backing in committee from Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Rep. David Obey (D-WI). The cutoff was opposed by the Bush Administration's State Department, the Pentagon, lobbyists for the Indonesian military and prominent US corporations.

In March 1993, under pressure from Congress, the State Department reversed its pro-Jakarta stance and co-sponsored a successful resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission criticizing Indonesian abuses in East Timor. In July 1993, again under Congressional pressure, the State Department blocked a transfer of US F-5 fighter planes from the government of Jordan to Indonesia, citing human rights as one of the reasons.

The Jakarta Post editorialized that the blockage of the F-5 deal "resounded like [a] sonic boom" in Indonesia, showing just how secure Jakarta elites had viewed the supply of US armaments up until that point. That same month, President Clinton, in response to a letter from 43 Senators, raised the Timor issue in a meeting in Japan with Suharto.

During his first presidential campaign candidate Bill Clinton said that the US approach to East Timor has been "unconscionable." In September 1993, at a press conference, President Clinton turned aside the argument that pressuring Indonesia on East Timor and human rights would have an adverse impact on business. He said, "The United States does have a very strong position on human rights, and I think we should... (b)ut that has not undermined our... commercial relationships... with countries that we think are making an honest effort to shoot straight with us and to work with us... We have questions about the issue of East Timor... but we have had good contact with Indonesia."

Though US weapons manufacturers might see reduced profits because of a ban or cutback on weapons sales, such would not affect US corporations in Indonesia, engaged in other lines of business. Their relationship with Jakarta is one of mutual profit, a basic fact unaffected by Timor policy.

In September 1993, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously adopted an amendment by Sen. Russell Feingold (D-WI) to condition major arms sales to Indonesia on human rights improvements in East Timor. The amendment was a compromise version worked out after extensive negotiation with the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) said that the amendment will "get strong support from the entire United States Senate [and] send a very important message to Indonesia about our concerns regarding human rights."

The Feingold amendment sent political shock waves through Jakarta, though the authorization bill to which it was attached never reached the Senate floor. Although the administration had signed off on the compromise amendment, some individual officials mounted a campaign to keep the Feingold amendment from being attached to another legislative vehicle.

Early in 1994, in the wake of the Feingold amendment, the State Department imposed a ban on the sale of small and light arms and riot control equipment to Indonesia. The ban presented the first occasion in which an across-the-board prohibition had been imposed on any type of weapons sale to Indonesia. The small arms ban set an important precedent of tacit acceptance on the part of the State Department of the principle that withholding weapons sales can advance human rights. Now the issue becomes: what kind of sales should be withheld?

Since the 1991 massacre, the State Department has licensed more than 250 military sales to Indonesia. The items sold have ranged from machine guns and M-16s to electronic components, from communications gear to spare parts for attack planes. Every shipment sends the political message that the Indonesian armed forces in their illegal occupation of East Timor still enjoy active US government support.

The US should end those sales completely, and inform the UN Secretary General that it is now willing to support enforcement of the Security Council resolutions which call on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor "without delay". This would mean supporting the call of Catholic Bishop Carlos Belo, co-recipient of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, for a UN-supervised referendum in which the Timorese would freely choose their own political status.

In its version of the Foreign Aid Appropriations for FY 1995, the House of Representatives sought to renew the ban on IMET and close a loophole under which Indonesia continued to purchase some of the same training. The committee report accompanying the bill expressed "outrage" that the administration "despite its vocal embrace of human rights" allowed the purchase of training. In July, the Senate put into law the prohibition on the sale of small arms.

A few weeks before, the Senate had voted down an effort to ban the use of US-supplied lethal arms in East Timor. The appropriations bill, as agreed to in committee of both houses of Congress, only continued the IMET ban and prohibited small arms sales to Indonesia.

The proposed provision in effect restated the US- Indonesia treaty signed in 1958 which restricts the use of US-supplied weapons to "legitimate self-defense" and strictly forbids their use for "an act of aggression." Soon after the invasion in 1975, Henry Kissinger had chastised one of his functionaries for pointing out that the invasion blatantly violated this treaty. Though the treaty still stands, it continues to be ignored, necessitating that the battle over arms sales and transfers be fought piecemeal.

In February 1995, a bi-partisan group of nine Senators urged President Clinton to support a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission calling for steps to improve human rights in East Timor. It reads: "We believe that the US relationship with Indonesia should enable us to effectively press our concerns with the Jakarta government." Members of the House Human Rights Caucus sent a similar letter, expressing concern about "the lack of progress on human rights and the perpetual reports of torture and other serious abuses."

In 1995, when Congress partially restored IMET, it continued to make clear that it does not accept the human rights conduct of Indonesia's military. The foreign aid appropriations limited IMET to the "expanded" version which purports to focus on human rights and civilian control of the military. In March 1997, the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee received Administration testimony that the US sold Indonesia military training without Congressional notification or consent throughout 1996, despite Congressional limits on assistance to non-military training in its 1996 authorization.

The final version of the FY1996 State Department reorganization bill would have extended the small arms ban to include helicopter-mounted equipment. The ban would remain in effect until the Secretary of State certifies significant progress on human rights in East Timor and in Indonesia, including compliance with UN human rights recommendations, significant reductions in Indonesia's troop presence in East Timor, a degree of local political control for East Timorese, and Indonesian cooperation with the UN Secretary General. Although the overall bill was vetoed, the State Department has agreed to continue and expand the small arms ban.

In October 1995, bi-partisan groups of legislators from both houses sent letters to President Clinton before he met with Suharto. The Senate letter stated, "Violence in the territory has been on the increase as well, especially since the APEC Summit in Jakarta last November... [D]uring the Summit protesters were detained and, by most accounts, tortured at the hands of Indonesian soldiers. Other reports of deaths of protesters at the hands of the Indonesian soldiers have continued all year."

Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), on the final international trip of his distinguished Senate career, visited East Timor in May, 1996. In his report to Chairman Helms, he wrote: "...widespread reports of abuse continue, including arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearances and killings. I heard several credible reports of these types of abuses while I was there.... Simply put, the people of East Timor feel they are subjugated by a foreign army of occupation.... When asked how a plebiscite on the issue of independence versus integration would turn out, I was told that over 90% of the people would choose independence and that number would include some who formerly supported integration." Other U.S. officials who have visited East Timor include Congressmen Frank Wolf (R-VA) and Patrick Kennedy (D-RI), and Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck.

Again in November 1996, 15 Senators, led by Russell Feingold (D-WI), sent a letter to President Clinton. The letter stated: "We believe now is the time for the United States to take a leading role in advocating for the right of the East Timorese to choose their own government through a UN-sponsored referendum." Clinton replied: "I note with interest your support of a UN-sponsored self-determination referendum in East Timor. I will take your idea into consideration."

Also in November 1996, House International Relations Committee Chair Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), wrote the Washington Post pledging a resolution of disapproval if the administration went ahead with the sale of nine F-16 fighter planes for sale to Indonesia. The sale was repeatedly postponed due to Congressional and grassroots pressure until, in June 1997, Suharto wrote Clinton rejecting not only the F-16s, but Expanded IMET (E-IMET) as well. Suharto stated that he would not accept restrictions on military transfers linked to human rights improvements.

However, despite the termination of IMET training, US Green Berets continue to train Indonesian Kopassus (Special Forces) and US Marines still train Indonesian Marines. Kopassus troops have been implicated in some of the worst atrocities in East Timor.

The so-called Indogate campaign finance scandal (when the DNC accepted contributions linked to Indonesia's Lippo bank) increased President Clinton's sensitivity about East Timor. In its wake, Clinton has made some gestures toward supporting East Timor. In April, the UN Human Rights Commission passed a resolution on East Timor with US co-sponsorship. In June, during a meeting between Bishop Belo and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, President Clinton briefly stopped by.

There are currently two bills pending containing important language on East Timor. The House version of the State Department Authorization bill includes three relevant provisions: the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, Tony Hall's (D-OH) amendment calling for a just solution in East Timor, and Patrick Kennedy's (D-RI) and Howard Berman's (D-CA) "Sense of Congress," which would restrict US government weapons sales and military assistance to Indonesia until substantial improvements in human rights are met.

The Foreign Operations Appropriations now contains language which would ban IMET and condition weapons sales to Indonesia, call for envoys in East Timor, and encourage the administration to support international efforts to find a just solution in East Timor. These conditions will become law as long as the entire FY 1998 Appropriations Bill is passed by congress.

In the years since the Santa Cruz massacre, grassroots pressure has produced real change in what presidential candidate Clinton had called the U.S.'s "unconscionable" policy. However, given that we have had to fight the administration, the state department, several influential Indonesia-friendly congressmen, and major corporations such as GE and AT&T uphill all the way, it cannot be said that U.S. policy is any more conscionable under President Clinton.

To bring the U.S. to support genuine self-determination in East Timor will require sustained pressure on congress and the administration, and the support of people like you.

(last updated 11/12/97)

The Inquisitor

One does what one can. I am currently helping someone. Check your PM.

obmar

Thanks... Did you take a look at the e-group link I gave?

I manage to round up quite a bit of people into it. Elaborate profile,
but all thinking of doing good while we are still here....Interesting discussions there, very local in nature...and in english too, though not perfect english...

see, I am the group owner....