Aquilaria spp.

obmar · Aquilaria spp.

http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/13/prop/E13-P49.pdf

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http://www.bioone.org/perlserv/?r...ument&doi=10.1663%2F0013-0001(2002)056%5B0271%3ATGTIII%5D2.0.CO%3B2

Economic Botany
Article: pp. 271–284 | Abstract | PDF (125K)

The Gaharu Trade in Indonesia: Is It Sustainable?1
Tonny SoehartonoA and Adrian C. NewtonB

A. Institute of Ecology and Resource Management, University of Edinburgh, Kings Buildings, Mayfield Rd., Edinburgh, UK. EH9 3JU; Present address: DG Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, Manggala Wanabakti Block VII, Gatot Subroto, Jakarta, Indonesia, B. Institute of Ecology and Resource Management, University of Edinburgh, Kings Buildings, Mayfield Rd., Edinburgh, UK. EH9 3JU; Present address: UNEP—World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 219 Huntingdon Road, Cambridge CB3 0DL, UK

Abstract
When subjected to fungal attack, Aquilaria spp. (Thymelaeaceae) produce a fragrant resin that is traded internationally as gaharu. Socioeconomic aspects of the gaharu trade were investigated via interviews with collectors and local and international traders. In addition, the extent of local and international trade was evaluated by reference to official government statistics. Evidence that gaharu resources are declining was obtained from the personal experience of gaharu collectors, and official statistics relating to the declining number of gaharu export companies in operation. Traders also reported that the main source of gaharu has recently switched from Sumatra and Kalimantan to sources in eastern Indonesia (Maluku and Irian Jaya), a finding supported by official statistics. Disparities recorded between official figures for the price and volume of gaharu in local and international trade, supported by comments made by export traders, indicate that a high proportion of the more valuable, high-grade gaharu is traded illegally by personal transaction. Interviews with gaharu collectors indicated that traditional approaches to harvesting are declining, as more nonlocal people become involved in collection, leading to more intensive harvesting practices. Together, these findings suggest that the current Indonesian trade in gaharu is not sustainable.

Resumen
Aquilaria spp. (Thymelaeaceae) jika terserang jamur menghasilkan resin berbau harum yang dikenal sebagai gaharu. Aspek sosial-ekonomi dari perdagangan gaharu di Indonesia ini diteliti melalui wawancara dengan para pengumpul, pedagang lokal dan pedagang internasional. Selain itu, perdagangan internasional juga dievaluasi berdasarkan angka statistik resmi. Bukti bahwa sumberdaya gaharu telah menurun diperoleh dari pengalaman para pengumpul gaharu dan statistik resmi, dikaitkan pula dengan menurunnya kegiatan ekspor gaharu. Para pedagang menyatakan bahwa sumber utama gaharu telah berpindah dari Sumatra dan Kalimantan ke lokasi di Indonesia bagian timur (Maluku dan Irian Jaya). Kenyataan ini juga didukung oleh data statistik. Adanya perbedaan antara data resmi untuk harga dan volume gaharu pada perdagangan lokal dan internasional, yang didukung oleh informasi dari eksportir, menunjukkan bahwa sebagian besar gaharu kualitas tinggi telah diperdagangkan secara ilegal melalui transaksi pribadi. Wawancara dengan pengumpul gaharu mengindikasikan pula bahwa pendekatan tradisional untuk memanen gaharu telah menurun dengan bertambahnya jumlah pendatang yang turut serta dalam pengumpulan, sehingga mengakibatkan pemanenan gaharu yang lebih intensif. Temuan penelitian ini membuktikan bahwa perdagangan gaharu Indonesia pada saat ini tidak lestari.

Keywords: harvesting, sustainability, gaharu, CITES, NTFP

DOI: 10.1663/0013-0001(2002)056[0271:TGTIII]2.0.CO;2

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AQUILARIA
A. beccariana Tiegh. - Karas (*)
Midstorey/subcanopy tree, treelet, shrub · VEG: Kerangas, Kerangas Forest with Agathis, LMDF, HDF · HAB: flat ground; near running fresh water · GEO: White sand; Kerangas soil, sandy soil · ALT: 50 m

BEL: Bt. Sawat, Sungai Mau F.R., Argent 91209; Bukit Sawat, Jln. Labi, Dransfield J. 7281; Bukit Sawat, Jln. Labi, Wong 1750; Labi, Flemmich KEP 34453; Labi, Johns 7438; Labi, Bt. Teraja, Simpson 2024; Labi, Jln. Bt. Puan, Richards 5563; Seria, Badas F.R., Coode 7648 · Sumatra, Malaya, Borneo

A. cf. beccariana Tiegh.
BEL: Andulau area, Wong s.n. 88.

A. sp. indet.
TUT: Rambai, Tasek Merimbun, Bernstein 358.

obmar · Gaharu trade in PNG

http://www.cites.org/eng/com/PC/11/X-PC11-Inf.%2011.pdf

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Papua New Guinea

In conjunction with WWF South Pacific Programme and the CITES Secretariat, TRAFFIC Oceania published a report "The Final Frontier. Towards sustainable management of Papua New Guinea's Agarwood resource" in October 2001 (available at www.traffic.org) with recommendations for further action including:

• raise awareness amongst stakeholders to ensure best practice sustainable harvest guidelines;

• conduct CITES assessment with specific reference to Decisions 11.112 and 11.113 an analysis on whether to include additional species in the genus Aquilaria in CITES Appendix II;

• develop a conservation and management strategy in PNG;

• conduct further field research on gaharu trade in New Guinea;

• develop legislative mechanisms and enforcement /management capacity in PNG;

• conduct taxonomic research, noting that the systematic relationship between Aquilaria and Gyrinops requires further study; and

• further cooperation between stakeholders in PNG.

Papua New Guinea will require further scientific work and investigation to be done on this trade:

• to determine whether a proposal to list the entire genus Aquilaria on Appendix II is appropriate; and

• as very little is known about grading of the products, to support development of standard trade controls and guidelines for this trade.

Of relevance to Plants Committee was the statement concerning “Consideration of imposing a CITES Appendix III listing on PNG gaharu-producing species until the harvest and trade situation is further clarified”.

The report also recommends that Decisions 11.112 and 11.113 be widened to include at least the two species of Gyrinops (G. versteegii and G. ledermannii) known to be harvested for gaharu.

In October 2001, TRAFFIC Oceania initiated further research into the trade in agarwood (gaharu) from the Indonesian (Irian Jaya, now known as the province of Papua) side of the island of New Guinea. Observations on the gaharu trade in the southern district of Merauke were collected and discussed with the Indonesian CITES Management Authority in Jakarta (in February 2002). Some priorities for further action include the following points:

• Designing standard methodology for determining wild population status for the purpose of setting quotas for gaharu-producing species along the lines of a CITES-standard “non-detriment finding”;

• Initiating field surveys to ‘ground-truth’ levels of harvest in relation to non-CITES export quotas set for Papua (Irian Jaya), and CITES export quotas for A. malaccensis in other provinces of Indonesia;

• Confirming the identity and number of tree species being harvested for gaharu in Papua (Irian Jaya).

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Growing Aquilaria Trees and Producing Cultivated
Gaharu: Prospects for a New Economy in Sabah.

The trade of Gaharu wood from Borneo and other parts of South-East Asia is
estimated to be worth several billion ringgit a year. On May 15, 2006 the Sabah
Forestry Department represented by Dr. Robert Ong organised a seminar on
the possibilities of producing cultivated Gaharu in forest plantations. The
seminar was held at the Rainforest Discovery Center, Sepilok and conducted
by one of the foremost experts on Gaharu, Prof. Robert Blanchette and Mr.
Joel Jurgens from the University of Minnesota. They provided a detailed
overview on the current knowledge of Gaharu trade and its worldwide use.
Prof. Blanchette also reported from commercial Aquilaria plantations in
Vietnam and Thailand where the cultivation of Gaharu had been successful.
Finally, the seminar participants vividly discussed the prospects of Gaharu
cultivation for Sabah.

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Titre du document / Document title
Conservation and sustainable use of tropical trees in the genus Aquilaria II. The impact of gaharu harvesting in Indonesia
Auteur(s) / Author(s)
SOEHARTONO Tonny (1) ; NEWTON Adrian C. (2) ;
Affiliation(s) du ou des auteurs / Author(s) Affiliation(s)
(1) DG Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, Manggala Wanabakti Block VII, Gatot Subroto, Jakarta, INDONESIE
(2) Institute of Ecology and Resource Management, University of Edinburgh, Kings Buildings, Mayfield Rd., Edinburgh EH9 3JU, ROYAUME-UNI
Résumé / Abstract
Aquilaria spp. are the main source of gaharu, one of the most valuable non-timber products harvested from tropical forests. In order to assess the impact of gaharu harvesting on populations of Aquilaria spp. in Indonesia, the activities of gaharu collectors were assessed by accompanying them on collecting expeditions. Gaharu harvesting generally involved felling the tree, with 31-92% of trees encountered being felled. The quantity of gaharu obtained from each felling was extremely low, mean values ranging from 0.10-0.18 kg tree [-1] to 0.19-2.13 kg tree[-1] for high and low grade gaharu respectively. A combination of these values with gaharu trade figures for the early 1990s enabled the number of Aquilaria spp. trees harvested annually in Indonesia to be estimated. Values ranged from less than 30,000 to more than 100,000 trees felled, depending on the year. Field assessments of two populations of Aquilaria spp. were used to parameterize a matrix model, which was used to predict the impact of different harvesting regimes on population dynamics of the species. Values of the dominant latent root (λ) were 1.22 and 1.20 for A. malaccensis in West Kalimantan and A microcarpa in East Kalimantan respectively, indicating that both populations are self-sustaining in the absence of harvesting. Analysis of λ under different harvesting scenarios indicated that for A. malaccensis, population expansion will continue if harvesting is set at a minimum diameter at breast height (dbh) of above 10 cm, but for A. microcarpa, a population decline will occur if trees with a dbh of less than 30 cm are harvested. Given current harvesting practices, it is, therefore, unlikely that gaharu is being sustainably harvested at present. These results suggest that the gaharu trade may have had a substantial impact on the population size of Aquilaria spp. in Indonesia, and their implications are discussed in the context of setting harvest quotas for regulation of trade, as required by CITES.
Revue / Journal Title
Biological conservation (Biol. conserv.) ISSN 0006-3207 CODEN BICOBK
Source / Source
2001, vol. 97, no1, pp. 29-41 (1 p.1/4)
Langue / Language
Anglais
Editeur / Publisher
Elsevier, Oxford, ROYAUME-UNI (1968) (Revue)
Mots-clés anglais / English Keywords
Plant conservation ; Sustainable use ; Forest product ; Natural resin ; Forest logging ; Forest stand ; Regulation ; Kalimantan ; Gaharu ; Borneo ; Asia ; Agroforestry ; Thymelaeaceae ; Dicotyledones ; Angiospermae ; Spermatophyta ;
Mots-clés français / French Keywords
Protection flore ; Exploitation durable ; Produit forestier ; Résine naturelle ; Exploitation forestière ; Peuplement forestier ; Réglementation ; Kalimantan ; Aquilaria ; Gaharu ; Bornéo ; Asie ; Agroforesterie ; Thymelaeaceae ; Dicotyledones ; Angiospermae ; Spermatophyta ;
Mots-clés espagnols / Spanish Keywords
Protección flora ; Exploitación sustentable ; Producto de la selva ; Resina natural ; Explotación forestal ; Rodal forestal ; Reglamentación ; Kalimantan ; Expansión población ; Borneo ; Asia ; Agroforestal ; Thymelaeaceae ; Dicotyledones ; Angiospermae ; Spermatophyta ;
Localisation / Location
INIST-CNRS, Cote INIST : 14169, 35400009549131.0030

Copyright 2006 INIST-CNRS. All rights reserved

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Buletin Eksport Kayu-Kayan No. 19/87
Tarikh Dikeluarkan: 28 DECEMBER 2004
Subjek: PROCEDURES FOR TRADE OF CITES LISTING SPECIES - RAMIN (GONYSTYLUS SPP.) AND KARAS/GAHARU (AQUILARIA SPP./ GYRINOPS SPP.)

1.

The 13th Meeting of Conference of the Parties, CITES which convened in Bangkok, Thailand from 2 - 14 October 2004 decided that Ramin (Gonystylus spp.) be uplisted from Appendix III to Appendix II Annotation 1 whilst Karas / Gaharu (Aquilaria spp./ Gyrinops spp.) be listed in Appendix II, CITES.

Annotation 1 designates all parts and derivatives, except:
1. seeds, spores and and pollen (including pollinia);
2. seedling or tissue cultures obtained in vitro, in solid or liquid media, transported in sterile containers; and
3. cut flowers of artificially propagated plants
2. Under Appendix II, CITES, all specimens and products of Ramin and Karas / Gaharu can only be traded after relevant documents known as CITES Export Permit, CITES Import Permit and CITES Re-Export Certificate are issued by the Management Authority (M.A) . These regulations cover specimens or products such as logs, sawntimber, plywood, veneer and include 'parts and derivatives' i.e. mouldings, furniture components and finished furniture.
3. Under CITES, ' specimen ' is defined as any animal or plant, whether alive or dead. In the case of a plant; for species included in Appendix II, any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof specified in Appendix II in relation to the species.
4. MTIB as the M.A. for timber and timber products in Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah whilst Sarawak Forestry Department as the M.A. for timber and timber products in Sarawak , will ensure that the trade (export, import and re-export) in specimens or products of Ramin and Karas / Gaharu , will abide all CITES procedures.
5. Effective from 12 January 2005, the M.A. will issue CITES Export Permit to exporters of Ramin and Karas / Gaharu which originate from Malaysia , CITES Import Permit to importers of Ramin and Karas / Gaharu, and CITES Re-Export Certificate to traders of these species which originate from other countries. The importers are requested to furnish the CITES Export Permit from the exporting country before the M.A. can issue the CITES Import Permit.
6. Trade in Ramin and Karas / Gaharu with non-parties of CITES is allowed. However, an equivalent document (such as permit or authorised document) produced by a legitimate authority in the country of export is acceptable by the M.A. and Customs Authorities.
7. All exporters and importers of Ramin and Karas / Gaharu are required to apply for the relevant " form " from the M.A. Upon completion of the form, each application for Ramin and Karas / Gaharu CITES Export Permit must be accompanied by a document such as Removal Pass issued by the Forestry Department which will ascertain the source from which the species is derived in Malaysia.
8. The fee for issuance of one set of CITES Export/Import Permit and CITES Certificate of Re-export in Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah is Ringgit Malaysia : Twenty Only (RM20.00 ).
9. This bulletin supersedes any previous document pertaining to the trade in Ramin and Gaharu and will take effect as of 12 January 2005.

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Sustainability and Market Structure in Renewable
Natural Resource Markets: The Case of Gaharu in
Papua New Guinea
Nicolas Gerber (presenting) and Robert J. Hill
School of Economics
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052, Australia
E-Mail: n.gerber@unsw.edu.au, r.hill@unsw.edu.au
©2005 by the authors
March 25, 2005
This paper considers the current state of the gaharu market in Papua New Guinea
(PNG). It can be roughly characterized as a monopsony market in which a foreign in-
termediary buys up the harvest of gaharu from a number of villages, which it then in
turn sells on the international market. We consider the impact of the current market
structure on sustainability of the gaharu market in PNG and the income of the villages.
It is difficult to reach firm conclusions given the huge amount of uncertainty about the
stock, growth rate and rate of extraction. From a theoretical perspective, a monop-
sony market structure can act to protect the resource as the monopsonist restricts the
amount harvested so as to reduce the price it must pay to the the villages. It could
be argued, however, that this is achieved at the expense of exploitation of the villages.
Also, it seems likely that the current rate of extraction even under monopsony exceeds
the sustainable rate. Sustainability is further improved if the monopsonist feels its posi-
Page 2
tion is secure, and hence seeks to maximize its discounted stream of future profits rather
than instantaneous profits. Given the precariousness of propertu rights in PNG, it is
highly unlikely that the monopsonist will take such a longer term view. The government
in PNG and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are keen to improve sustainabil-
ity and reduce exploitation of villages by foreign intermediaries. Achieving both these
goals simultaneously will not be easy. We consider the likely impact of the government
taking over the role of the intermediary, breaking up the monopsony, imposing quotas
or tariffs, and encouraging the villages to trade directly on the international market. It
is important that the analysis of such policy initiatives is framed in a realistic context
that takes account of the high level of corruption in PNG. Any kind of government
intervention is likely to stimulate bribes and smuggling. There are also concerns about
how the funds earned are affecting the social structure in villages, as villagers abandon
traditional occupations to participate in gaharu harvesting, and use the proceeds to
buy beer and spam. (JEL H23, L13, Q21, Q23)
KEYWORDS: Monopsony; Renewable Natural Resource; Sustainability; Regulation;
Income Distribution; Corruption
1
Page 3
1. Introduction
Gaharu is a resinous, fragrant wood product. It is thought to result from the
contamination of particular species of trees by a combination of wounding and fungal
infection. Gaharu
1
has been traded for thousands of years for its aromatic properties
and is used in traditional medicine, religious and cultural ceremonies. The trade has
connected centers of market demand in the Middle East and East Asia with the gaharu
range states beginning in India and extending eastwards to Papua New Guinea (PNG).
Due to the depletion of the resource in some traditional countries of production, the
pressures to harvest in newly discovered resource pools such as PNG are high.
The trade in gaharu has grown rapidly in PNG since it started in 1997. It is now
the main source of income for many people in remote communities. The exploitation
of the resource is not subject to any form of regulation and there are concerns about
the sustainability of the trade. The distribution of the resource rent is another concern,
with the producers thought to be missing out. It is in response to these concerns that
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) South Pacific Program and TRAFFIC International
asked one of the authors to look at the dynamics linking the market structure, the
capture of the resource rent and the conservation of the resource. The present paper,
although stylizing some of the facts, builds on the information collected during a three
week field trip (see Gerber, 2003, and Zich and Compton, 2001).
The market can be summarized as a large group of producers (the village clans,
traditional landowners in PNG) and a small number of intermediaries who export the
gaharu to the international market. The data available from the PNG National Forest
Authority (PNGFA) focuses on the official exports of gaharu starting in 1999.
2
There
are no official figures on rates of harvest. Numerous interviews with villagers in seven
1
Also called agarwood, aloeswood or eaglewood. The term gaharu is used predominantly in the
natives’ conversations in PNG and hence will be used throughout this paper.
2
The data used by the authors in this paper consists of two data sets provided by the PNGFA. The
first one gives an account of all the official gaharu exports between the start of 1999 and the end of
June 2004. It shows the exact date, total quantity and total value (US$) of each gaharu export, with
mention of the export company. The second data set consists of the detailed composition of each export
permit, between September 20, 2001, and the end of June 2004. It provides the quantity per grade
2
Page 4
production areas were conducted and remain the only information available on the
supply side. For the present paper, this information can be summarized by saying that
the production of gaharu is reasonably uniform throughout the different villages both
in terms of effort and remuneration. We assume here that gaharu is a uniform good.
In fact different qualities exist and command different prices. The quality of the good,
however, can only be identified ex post and is somewhat subjective. The variation in
the reported value per kilogram of the official exports since 2002 is not reliable since
the amount of tax payable on exports depends on the reported quality of the gaharu.
This has caused a systematic decrease in reported quality (see Gerber, 2003).
3
In the coming sections, we base our analysis around the three major factors that
distinguish the market for gaharu in PNG to most markets for renewable resources,
even to gaharu markets in the other production states. Firstly, the trade in PNG is
characterized by the fact that it does not present a case of common ownership of the
resource, unlike the other gaharu producing states. Secondly, the two groups of players
involved in the trade in PNG have shown remarkable short-sightedness, a condition
unlikely to improve even under different market structures within the country. Only a
combination of long term societal and cultural changes and appropriate trade regulation
might succeed in addressing such myopic behaviors. Finally, PNG gaharu producers
would remain price takers on the international markets, even if they formed their own
cartel and by-passed the export intermediaries.
2. The Case of Monopsony
of each export, the selling price (US$) per kilogram for each grade for each export, the denomination
of each grade and the name of the export company. Both data sets can be obtained upon request.
A summary of the first data set is provided in the appendix (Table 1, showing the quaterly exports
(quantity and value) between 1999 and June 200.
3
Official data showing the exports differentiated per quality and mentioning the export price of
each quality was only made available for the period October 2001- June 2003. The data is split in six
quarters, the first quarter is the reference. The second quarter (January-March 02) is the transition
quarter during which an export levy (10% of total value) was implemented. Results are shown in Table
2 in the appendix.
3
Page 5
Gaharu is harvested by a number of villages. Each village pools its harvest and
then sells it to an intermediary. It is assumed here that there is only one intermediary
that buys up all the gaharu from all the villages. Although there are in fact a small
number of intermediaries active in PNG (the main players are A & F Forest Products,
Eaglewood and L & T Forest Products), there is evidence of collusion through price
fixing between them.
4
Collectively, therefore, they behave like a monopsonist. The
intermediary, it is assumed, faces the following inverse supply curve:
5
P(t) =
α + βQ(t)
[1 + S(t)]
γ
,
(1)
where P(t) denotes the price at which the intermediary buys the gaharu from the vil-
lages, Q(t) denotes the quantity of gaharu purchased, S(t) denotes the remaining stock
of gaharu, and α, β and γ denote nonnegative parameters.
6
The industry is subject to a
stock effect. That is, as the stock of gaharu diminishes the cost of harvesting rises. As a
result, the price the intermediary must pay to the villages also rises. Generally, villages
do not accumulate stockpiles of gaharu. Whatever is harvested is sold immediately to
the intermediary. One explanation is that the quality of the gaharu deteriorates over
time unless stored in the right (i.e., dry) conditions.
The intermediary then sells the gaharu on the international market. To simplify
4
In February 2002, the PNGFA circulated an indicative price list for the five official grades exported
from PNG: Super A, 2000 PGK/kg; A, 1500 PGK/kg; B, 1000 PGK/kg; C, 500 PGK/kg; D, 50
PGK/kg (in 2002, 1 PGK
'
0.25 USD). Producers stated that those prices were loosely or even not
implemented. Many producers of the mountainous regions of the PNG-Indonesia border are still
engaging in risky smuggling operations. They claim to receive higher prices in West Papua, where
there is a large number of intermediaries. Although direct comparisons of prices paid to producers
between PNG and West Papua are difficult (not the same classification of grades), this reinforces the
idea that collusion at the intermediary level in PNG is keeping the producers’ prices down.
5
It is shown in the next section that, given the cost functions faced by the villages, this implies
that each village maximizes its instantaneous profit rather than its present discounted value of future
profits.
6
To simplify the notation, whenever possible, time arguments will be suppressed.

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the analysis, it is assumed that the intermediary is a price taker on the international
market. Again this assumption is not that unreasonable given that PNG is a small
player on the international gaharu market.
7
The profit earned by the intermediary is
determined as follows:
Π =
"
X − k −
α + βQ
(1 + S)
γ
#
Q,
(2)
where X denotes the price at which the intermediary sells the gaharu on the interna-
tional market. To simplify matters it is assumed that the intermediary has a constant
marginal cost of k.
The natural growth rate of gaharu is denoted by G(S). It is assumed that the
intermediary is myopic and simply maximizes profits each period. Such an approach is
not unrealistic since each period there is a risk that the PNG government will intervene
and the intermediary will lose its monopsony status or that the members of the cartel
will cease to collude.
Our particular focus of interest is the impact of market structure on the remaining
stock of gaharu. It is easily verified that the instantaneous profit maximizing level of
Q is given by
Q
∗
=
(1 + S)
γ
(X − k) − α
2β
.
(3)
Therefore, the stock will rise over time until Q = G(S) if Q(0)
∗
≤ G[S(0)]. Suppose
instead that Q(0)
∗
> G[S(0)]. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this situation is the
one that applies to the gaharu market in PNG. If Q(0)
∗
≥ G[S(0)], then the stock S
will fall over time, as will Q
∗
as a result of the stock effect. In the absence of a stock
7
The two main markets for gaharu are Taiwan and Singapore. Over the period 1993-1998, Taiwan
imported 4455 tons of gaharu. Main contributors (as exporters or re-exporters) were Indonesia (60%),
Vietnam (12%), Thailand (7%), Cambodia (7%) and Malaysia (4%). Singapore exported and re-
exported 1113 tons of gaharu originating from the Aquilaria malaccensis species alone over the period
1995-1997. In calendar years, PNG official exports are: 1 ton in 1999, 2.6 tons in 2000, 10.5 tons
in 2001, 9.4 tons in 2002 and 12.1 tons in 2003. See Barden et al. (2000) for more details on the
international markets.
5
Page 7
effect, the stock would eventually fall to zero. The presence of a stock effect makes the
dynamics more complicated. Suppose the growth function has the following quadratic
form:
8
G(S) = S
µ
S
max
− S
2
¶
.
For many cases of natural resources, we would need to consider a minimum level of
stock S
min
below which the resource is doomed to extinction. For gaharu though, S
min
is likely to tend to zero since trees produce many seeds.
9
The market will converge
to an equilibrium where Q
∗
= G(S). Some examples of the dynamics are graphed in
Figures 1 to 3 (Appendix). In the three cases drawn, 0 < γ < 1. The three equilibria
situation cannot be observed if γ > 1 or if S
min
> 0.
3. Breaking Up the Monopsony
Suppose that each village has reasonably well defined de facto property rights,
10
and
that the government breaks up the monopsony so that each village can trade directly
on the international market. It is assumed here that each village owns an equal share
of the initial stock S(0) (i.e., S(0)
i
= S(0)/N).
8
Despite substantial scientific efforts, the growth of the gaharu itself inside the host tree is not well
understood. However, the stock of gaharu is obviously related to the number of potential host trees.
Furthermore, older trees seem to produce better quality gaharu (more ”mature” gaharu and larger
pieces; see Zich and Compton, 2001). This suggests that using the stock growth of the trees as a proxy
for the stock growth of gaharu is reasonable.
9
So far, the only gaharu producing species officially recognized as such in PNG is Gyrinops leder-
mannii. The tree produces hundreds of flowers, each of them potentially producing one fruit and each
fruit containing at least two seeds.
10
This is a feature of PNG, where clan ownership is not disputed. In other gaharu producing
states, gaharu harvesters compete for the open access resource, quickly depleting the states’ forests.
In Indonesia, intermediaries sometimes fly harvesters into the national parks by helicopters (Barden el
al., 2000). For a detailed discussion on property rights and natural resources see Schlager and Ostrom
(1992).
6
Page 8
Each village faces the following cost function:
c(Q
i
) =
aQ
i
+ bQ
2
i
(1 + S
i
/A
i
)
γ
,
where A
i
denotes the area of land owned by village i. Here we normalize the total area
to 1, i.e.,
P
N
i=1
A
i
= 1. Assuming that all villages own the same amount of land, it
follows that A
i
= 1/N for all i.
Each village is assumed to maximize instantaneous profits. This assumption can
again be justified by the large amount of uncertainty. Also, the remote gaharu producing
communities in PNG are not renowned for taking a long-term view with regard to
economic activities. For example, a significant proportion of the profits earned from
the gaharu trade are spent on pure consumption goods (e.g. alcohol).
11
The profit for
each village is
Π
i
=
"
XQ
i
−
aQ
i
+ bQ
2
i
(1 + NS
i
)
γ
#
,
where a,b > 0. Solving for Q
i
we obtain the following:
Q
∗
i
=
X(1 + NS
i
)
γ
− a
2b
.
Total output is obtained by summing across the N villages.
Q =
N
X
i=1
Q
∗
i
=
XN(1 + S)
γ
− aN
2b
(4)
Rearranging, the following inverse supply curve is obtained:
X =
2bQ + aN
N(1 + S)
γ
.
11
Several reasons might explain the short term view adopted by the producers. Firstly, these com-
munities are traditionally made of hunters and gatherers, leading to somewhat opportunistic bahaviors.
Agriculture plays a very minor role, with land mostly unsuitable for any crops. Secondly, the short life
expectancy (PNG average: 64 years) of those remote communities does not promote long-sightedness.
One of the communities visited had lost half its male members to a disease in less than a year.
The short term view adopted by the producers is certainly reflected in their ”going to the ATM”
expression used to describe a gaharu harvesting expedition.
7
Page 9
Suppose the international market price faced by villages trading on the international
market falls to the level P previously charged by the monopsonist. Then the aggregate
supply curve of the N villages should be the same as the supply curve faced by the
monopsonist when the international price is X. Therefore, referring back to equation
(1) we obtain that α = a and β = 2b/N. Hence we can rewriteQ and Q
∗
as follows:
Q =
X(1 + S)
γ
− α
β
,
(5)
Q
∗
=
N(1 + S)
γ
(X − k) − aN
4b
.
(6)
A comparison of (3) and (5) or (4) and (6) reveals thatQ = 2Q
∗
when k = 0. When
k > 0,Q > 2Q
∗
. In equilibrium, it must be the case thatQ = G(S) at a lower level of
S than under the monopsony as shown in Figure 4 (Appendix).
Suppose instead that the villages form a cartel and agree to harvest equal amounts
and maximize the joint present discounted value of future profits. The instantaneous
profit maximizing level of output for all the villages combined again equalsQ. This
is because the villages are price takers on the international market. If instead the
international demand curve is downward sloping, then the optimal output would be
lower thanQ.
The Crutchfield and Pontecorvo (1969) conjecture states that a monopsonistic in-
termediary can control a competitive open access harvesting sector and ensure that
extraction rates are efficient. Schworm (1983) describes efficiency in this case as hav-
ing extraction rates identical to those of an optimizing single-owner of the resource.
Schworm also derived the conditions under which the conjecture is true. The condi-
tions are that there must be a large number of competing harvesters with identical
convex technologies. Finally, Schworm expressed the sufficient conditions under which
the monopsonist’s stationary state of the resource stock is larger than that of a single
firm (which in turn is larger than that of a competitive open access harvesting sector
without monopsonistic control). The conditions are that there are no static externali-
ties and that the harvesting costs are strictly convex and can be expressed in terms of
the harvest to stock ratio.
8
Page 10
Clearly, in the present paper we do not have static (crowding) externality, as the
harvest of each producer is independent of the harvest of the other producers. The
dynamic externality is present, though, throughout the inclusion of a stock effect. The
cost function for each producer is strictly convex and can be expressed as a function
of the harvest-stock ratio
Q
S
. Schworm’s results thus suggest that if the monopsonist
and the producers were adopting a long term view, we should have a stationary state
for S larger than under the single firm scenario (which in our case is identical to the
aggregation of the N individual producers under a well defined property rights system).
Our results under the short term behavior assumption for both the monopsony and
the individual producers seem to go in the same direction: the instantaneous profit
maximizing level of harvest is lower under the monopsony than under the single firm
scenario. However, that does not say anything about the steady state values of the stock,
but only that these values (below or above the sustainable level) would be reached faster
under the single firm structure than under the monopsonistic structure.
4. Distributional Issues
The Government should be concerned about the share of total profits received by
the villages as well as the stock level of gaharu. The profits of each village i under the
monopsony regime (assuming the monopsonist profit maximizes) is
Π
i
=
[(X − k)(1 + S)
γ
− a]
2
16b(1 + S)
γ
.
(7)
If each village sells directly onto the international market, profit is
Π
i
=
[X(1 + S)
γ
− a]
2
4b(1 + S)
γ
.
( Cool

A comparison of (7) and ( Cool

reveals that when k = 0 profits for each village are four
times higher when they sell directly on the international market rather than to the
intermediary. Profits differ by more than a factor of four when k > 0.
These results clearly illustrate the conflict between sustainability and distributional
issues. The monopsony market structure acts to protect to some extent the resource
9
Page 11
stock. However, this is achieved at the expense of the villages that earn much lower
profits as a result. The profits earned by the intermediaries are repatriated to the
monopsonist’s home country (e.g. Singapore or Malaysia). Nevertheless, income levels
have risen significantly in many villages since the start of the gaharu trade. During
interviews with one of the authors, producers from the East Sepik region stated that
cash income increased from 200-700 PGK per year per household, selling mostly carvings
and crocodile skins, to 1000-3000 PGK per year per household since the start of the
gaharu trade. In the remote areas of the Sandaun province (west Sepik), producers
often didn’t have any cash income at all until they traded gaharu, now earning between
700 and 1500 PGK per year.
As well as the distribution of income, NGOs and government officials are concerned
about the use of the newly found cash income in the villages. Ideally, a large share of
the gaharu income should be invested in housing, equipment and tools, such as portable
sawmills and boat engines, health, and schools.
12
However, as was reported during the
interviews, the gaharu income is spent mostly on pure consumption goods. Food that
used to be hunted, gathered or cultivated is now often replaced by rice and tinned fish or
meat. Consumption of soft drinks has increased dramatically, with the associated effects
of a non-customary consumption of sugar. With a biased intra-family distribution of
the income towards the man, a large share of the money is wasted on alcohol as well,
creating new social problems within the communities.
Solutions need to be found to decrease the waste of the resource rent within the
communities. With regard to the problem of corruption discussed in the next section,
it seems preferable to have organizations closer to the communities looking after the
distribution of the resource rent. A solution is proposed later in the paper.
5. Mechanisms to Regulate the Stock and Distribution of Income
12
Indeed, the PNGFA sent young forestry graduates in remote areas to develop sustainable logging
programs using portable sawmills, the latter purchased by the communities themselves. Programs
aimed at the collection of rain water are also sponsored by NGOs, to prevent the consumption of
contaminated water from the rivers, in exchange for signing a charter on the sustainable use of the
clans’ forest.
10
Page 12
(i) Quotas
Quotas, in theory, provide a straightforward way of ensuring that the stock of
gaharu is kept at a desired level. If the maximum quota for the monopsonist is set
equal to G[S(0)], this guarantees that the stock will not decrease over time. Of course,
the Government may decide that the initial stock S(0) is either too high or too low, in
which case the quotas can be adjusted accordingly.
There are three main problems with the implementation of such a system. First,
it is far from certain that the Government is able to observe S(0), let alone G[S(0)].
13
Second, even if the Government can observe G(S
0
), is it also able to observe the quan-
tity Q of gaharu actually harvested? Third, even if it observes G[S(0)] and Q, is it
able to enforce its will on the intermediary? The risk exists that the intermediary will
circumvent a quota by a few well placed bribes of government officials. These issues are
discussed in greater detail in section 6.
(ii) Taxes
The impact of a tax τ on the monopsonist’s instantaneous profits is as follows:
Π =
"
X − k − τ −
α + βQ
(1 + S)
γ
#
Q.
This means that the instantaneous profit maximizing level of output is now
˜
Q =
(1 + S)
γ
(X − k − τ) − α
2β
.
If τ is set at a sufficiently high level, it will be possible to ensure that
˜
Q(0) ≤ G[S(0)],
thus guaranteeing that the stock of gaharu increases. If even after the imposition of the
tax it is still the case that
˜
Q(0) > G[S(0)], then the tax will act to increase the level of
S to which the system converges.
As with quotas, implementing the tax is not necessarily straightforward. It is not
clear that the Government has enough information to set τ at the appropriate level.
13
A current joint project of the CSIRO and WWF has produced a map of the potential distribution
in PNG of the gaharu producing species based on several geographical and biological criteria. The
map has already proved reasonably accurate.

obmar

Haji Arfan, Kegigihan Melestarikan Gaharu

Kompas/dirman thoha
Haji Arfan
PEPATAH tua "sudah gaharu, cendana pula" bisa dipastikan menunjukkan betapa dikenalnya kedua jenis tanaman tersebut. Namun, selama ini yang dikenal dengan baik sebagai tanaman yang bernilai tinggi hanyalah kayu cendana. Sedang tanaman gaharu tidak banyak yang tahu kegunaannya, apalagi jika tanaman itu tumbuh sehat tanpa cacat, yang berarti nyaris tak punya nilai ekonomi.

Hingga seperempat abad lalu, gaharu (Aquilaria spp) yang banyak dijumpai di hutan Indonesia itu, tumbuh nyaris tanpa gangguan. Dalam proses pertumbuhannya, alam membuatnya tidak tumbuh normal, dalam arti, gangguan alam menyebabkan gaharu terinfeksi penyakit yang kemudian diketahui menghasilkan gubal gaharu. Gubal gaharu yang mengandung damar wangi (Aromatic resin) untuk bahan baku beraneka jenis wewangian inilah yang kemudian mendorong perburuan gaharu.

Sejak tahun 1970-an, perburuan gaharu mulai dilakukan besar-besaran karena nilai ekspor gubal yang tinggi. Lalu, dalam waktu 10-15 tahun setelah itu, tanaman gaharu di Indonesia mulai terancam punah, terutama karena belum dikenalnya teknologi budidaya gaharu dan teknologi memproduksi gubal. Apalagi meluasnya perburuan kayu gaharu dilakukan dengan penebangan yang sia-sia. Artinya, banyak pohon gaharu yang tidak mengandung gubal ditebang dan mati.

Melihat kenyataan itu, Haji Arfan (63) di Dusun Lembah Sari, Desa Pusuk, Kecamatan Batulayar, Lombok Barat (Nusa Tenggara Barat/NTB), terdorong membudidayakan pohon gaharu. Terutama melihat kenyataan hutan Pusuk yang diketahui baik untuk vegetasi gaharu, nyaris tidak lagi ditemui gaharu. Dengan mengumpulkan anakan dan biji gaharu dari sisa-sisa pohon gaharu yang masih tumbuh di hutan Pusuk, ia kemudian gigih membudidayakan tanaman itu. Setidaknya, sejak tahun 1992 muncul harapan tanaman gaharu bisa dilestarikan. Apalagi, usaha itu didukung serangkaian penelitian Laboratorium Bioteknologi Fakultas Pertanian Universitas Mataram (Unram), Dinas Kehutanan NTB, bahkan Departemen Kehutanan.

Paling tidak, tanaman gaharu tumbuh subur di hutan Pusuk pada areal sekitar 60 hektar yang ditanam bekerja sama dengan Dinas Kehutanan dan 20 hektar yang ia tanam sendiri. Belum lagi dari jutaan bibit yang ia hasilkan, bukan saja tumbuh di hutan dan kebun, tapi juga di pekarangan penduduk terutama di Pulau Lombok.

***

USAHA membudidayakan gaharu tidak lepas dari ketekunannya bekerja mencari nafkah untuk kehidupannya bersama istri dan 12 anaknya. Ketekunan berusaha itu terlihat sejak Arfan menjadi pengusaha kayu bakar tahun 1963-1975. Setiap hari ia membeli sekitar 100 meter kubik (m3) kayu bakar dari penduduk dan dijual tiga kali seminggu ke Mataram, ibu kota NTB yang jaraknya sekitar 20 km dari Pusuk.

Ketika itu ia mengetahui di kawasan hutan Pusuk semakin sulit dijumpai tanaman gaharu. Kalaupun ada tanaman di kebun masyarakat, tidak terawat dengan baik. Karena itu, ia merelakan sebagian waktunya untuk mencegah kepunahan kayu tersebut dengan melakukan budidaya pembibitan dan penanaman pohon gaharu.

Bagi Arfan, kegiatan membudidayakan tanaman hutan bukan hal
asing. Sejak tahun 1978, ketika ia diangkat menjadi tenaga honorer sebagai mandor hutan pada Dinas Kehutanan Lombok Barat, ia biasa membibitkan tanaman penghijauan/reboisasi seperti mahoni, sonokeling, sengon, dan tanaman buah. Bibit tanaman itu dijual kepada Dinas Kehutanan dan masyarakat yang membutuhkan, untuk menutupi kebutuhan hidup keluarganya.

Di sela-sela tugasnya itu, sejak tahun 1992 Arfan mengumpulkan anakan dan biji gaharu dari hutan Pusuk dan membibitkan serta menanamnya pada kebun di pekarangan rumahnya. Namun diakui, kegiatan ini tidak mudah karena kegagalan tidak jarang dialami akibat kurangnya pengetahuan tentang gaharu. Namun, ia terus mencoba hingga diketahui cara dan kondisi lingkungan yang baik untuk lokasi pembibitan gaharu.

Pada awalnya bibit gaharu dijual dengan harga Rp 100 per pohon. Baru belakangan ia memperoleh harga
Rp 2.500. "Tapi, bibitnya sudah mulai sulit dicari dan sekarang paling banyak sekitar 25.000 bibit/anakan setahun," jelas Arfan.

Dalam menjalankan kegiatannya, usahanya Arfan tidak selalu berjalan mulus. Misalnya, tanaman gaharu yang ia kembangkan pernah habis dijarah. Namun, hal itu tidak menyurutkan keinginannya mengembangkan budidaya gaharu. Bahkan, berbekal honor sebagai mandor hutan dan sebagai buruh pada kegiatan reboisasi serta hasil penjualan tanaman bibit penghijauan ia meneruskan usahanya.

***

MESKI kegiatan yang dilakukan selama ini membuat Arfan meraih Penghargaan Kalpataru 2002, namun ia berterus terang sukses yang diraih itu tidak lepas dari kerja sama dengan berbagai pihak. Bahkan, lewat kerja sama dengan Dinas Kehutanan Lombok Barat tahun 1995, ia terlibat dalam proyek percontohan budidaya gaharu di hutan Pusuk pada areal 60 hektar.

Bantuan uang pemeliharaan Rp 5 juta per tahun dari Dinas Kehutanan, bisa ia sisihkan sebagian untuk mengembangkan sendiri budidaya tanaman gaharu. Pada areal 20 hektar juga di hutan Pusuk, tanamannya kini berusia 6-7 tahun. Kebun gaharu ini kemudian lewat kerja sama dengan Universitas Mataram dijadikan lokasi penelitian tanaman gaharu Fakultas Pertanian dan Laboratorium Bioteknologi Unram. Di kebun inilah Unram meneliti proses terjadinya gubal gaharu yang menghasilkan teknologi gubal gaharu.

Hasil penelitian itu yang kemudian mempercepat proses berkembangnya minat masyarakat menanam gaharu. Karena dengan ditemukannya sejenis jamur yang bisa menyebabkan pohon gaharu terinfeksi penyakit lalu menghasilkan gubal.

Dalam hal ini, Arfan bersama sekitar 10 orang rekannya di Desa Pusuk, menyediakan bibit yang disebarluaskan ke berbagai daerah di NTB, bahkan ke luar NTB. Sementara Dr Ir Parman, Kepala Laboratorium Bioteknologi Unram, menyediakan sejenis jamur yang disuntikkan ke batang pohon agar menghasilkan gubal.

Oleh sebab itu, kalangan pengusaha, aparat kehutanan dan pemerintah daerah serta masyarakat mendukung upaya budidaya yang dikaitkan dengan pengembangan hutan kemasyarakatan. Bahkan, dengan tersedianya tenaga ahli dan temuan rekayasa untuk memproduksi gubal oleh Dr Ir Parman, Pulau Lombok diharapkan menjadi salah satu pusat pengembangan tanaman gaharu.

Harapan Arfan, tentu saja masyarakat berkenan mengikuti jejaknya. Karena bukan saja tanaman gaharu bisa dilestarikan, tapi juga memberi penghasilan yang tidak bisa dibilang kecil. Dengan harga bibit Rp 2.500 per pohon, lalu menyediakan dana untuk menyuntikkan jamur dengan biaya sekitar Rp 50.000 untuk setiap pohon. Jika suntikan berhasil dan terbentuk gubal, keuntungan pemilik pohon bisa dibayangkan jauh sebelumnya. Setidaknya, satu kilogram gubal kualitas utama harganya sekitar Rp 2 juta-Rp 3 juta.

Namun, iming-iming ini belakangan tidak mendorong seluruh lapisan masyarakat ikut mengembangkan gaharu. Yang justru memprihatinkan Arfan ialah ulah segelintir orang yang justru bisa membuat warga enggan membudidayakan gaharu.

Ini terutama karena masih banyak orang yang lebih memilih jalan pintas agar lebih cepat memperoleh keuntungan tanpa kerja keras. Mereka itulah yang kemudian menjarah tanaman gaharu di hutan, kebun dan pekarangan.

"Bayangkan saja, tanaman gaharu setinggi satu meter dicuri dan belum tentu bisa hidup lagi," jelasnya kecewa.

Paling tidak, kejadian itu membuat Arfan merasa gagal mendorong masyarakat meningkatkan taraf hidup dengan kerja keras dan ketekunan. Keteladanannya akan semakin tidak dirasakan jika sikap masyarakat seperti itu tidak segera dihentikan. Apalagi jika kemudian menjadi pendorong punahnya kembali tanaman gaharu. (dirman thoha)

Aquilaria spp.

Gaharu trade in PNG